

Anti-Israel Sentiment Predicts Anti-Semitism in Europe

EDWARD H. KAPLAN

School of Management

Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, School of Medicine

Department of Chemical Engineering, Faculty of Engineering

Yale University

CHARLES A. SMALL

Institute for Social and Policy Studies

Yale University

and Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy

In the discourse surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, extreme criticisms of Israel (e.g., Israel is an apartheid state, the Israel Defense Forces deliberately target Palestinian civilians), coupled with extreme policy proposals (e.g., boycott of Israeli academics and institutions, divest from companies doing business with Israel), have sparked counterclaims that such criticisms are anti-Semitic (for only Israel is singled out). The research in this article shines a different, statistical light on this question: based on a survey of 500 citizens in each of 10 European countries, the authors ask whether those individuals with extreme anti-Israel views are more likely to be anti-Semitic. Even after controlling for numerous potentially confounding factors, they find that anti-Israel sentiment consistently predicts the probability that an individual is anti-Semitic, with the likelihood of measured anti-Semitism increasing with the extent of anti-Israel sentiment observed.

Keywords: *anti-Semitism; anti-Israel sentiment; anti-Zionism; European attitudes; conditional probability; Anti-Defamation League*

On April 22, 2005, the Executive Council of Britain's Association of University Teachers (AUT) voted to boycott two Israeli universities (Bar Ilan and Haifa). The boycott was advocated "as a contribution to the struggle to end Israel's occupation, colonization and system of apartheid" (<http://www.zionismontheweb.org/AUT/autres.htm>), while the boycott's main proponent stated that this action would increase pressure on the "illegitimate state of Israel" (<http://education.guardian.co.uk/higher/worldwide/story/0,9959,1466250,00.html>). Similarly spirited statements

AUTHORS' NOTE: The raw data with explanatory notes and additional technical material are available in an Excel file available at <http://jcr.sagepub.com/>. The data for this study were provided by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), and while we thank the ADL for sharing their data with us, the views expressed in this article are ours and do not represent the official positions or policies of the ADL. EHK was supported by the Yale School of Management research fund.

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include London Mayor Ken Livingstone's assertion that Israeli Prime Minister "Sharon continues to organise terror. More than three times as many Palestinians as Israelis have been killed in the present conflict" (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1430132,00.html>). Addressing suicide bombings in Israel, philosopher Ted Honderich wrote that "those Palestinians who have resorted to necessary killing have been right to try to free their people, and those who have killed themselves in the cause of their people have indeed sanctified themselves" (<http://chronicle.com/free/v50/i09/09b01201.htm>).

Many Israeli and Jewish individuals and organizations have characterized statements such as these as anti-Semitic in effect if not intent, given that Israel is singled out in the face of silence over human rights violations committed elsewhere. There is indeed a long and sad history of anti-Semitism in Europe and elsewhere (Almog 1988; Martire and Clark 1982; Selznick and Steinberg 1969). Dating back to the study of Adorno et al. (1950), several scholars have conducted empirical (i.e., survey-based) studies to determine those factors that characterize persons who exhibit more (or less) prejudice against Jews (Anti-Defamation League 1998, 2002; Frindte, Wettig, and Wammetsberger 2005; Konig, Eisinga, and Scheepers 2000; Konig, Scheepers, and Falling 2001; Lutterman and Middleton 1970; Weil 1985). In reviewing this literature, Konig, Scheepers, and Falling (2001) identify religious (e.g., Christian worldview, fundamentalism), social-psychological (e.g., anomie, authoritarianism), and sociostructural (e.g., age, education, gender) variables as key correlates of anti-Semitism at the individual level. More recently, scholars have addressed the relationship between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism (Frindte, Wettig, and Wammetsberger 2005; Wistrich 1990, 2004), but whether extreme criticism of Israel, as exemplified in the recent AUT boycott debate, is *de facto* anti-Semitic remains bitterly contested (<http://www.engageonline.org.uk>).

Although motivated by strong anti-Israel sentiment such as that earlier described, our research question is not whether anti-Israel *statements* are anti-Semitic in either effect or intent. Rather, we ask whether individuals with strong anti-Israel views are more likely to harbor anti-Semitic attitudes than others. Certainly, Bayes's rule would suggest this to be true. Let p be the proportion of the population with anti-Semitic leanings, q be the fraction of those with anti-Semitic leanings who are anti-Israel, and r be the fraction of those not anti-Semitic who are anti-Israel. Then, the fraction of those with anti-Israel views who are also anti-Semitic, f , is given by

$$f = \frac{pq}{pq + (1 - p)r} . \quad (1)$$

Presumably, those with anti-Semitic leanings would be more likely to espouse anti-Israel viewpoints than those who are not anti-Semitic (given that Israel presents itself as a Jewish state), implying that $q > r$, which in turn implies that the fraction of those with anti-Israel leanings who are anti-Semitic (f) exceeds the unconditional proportion of the population that is anti-Semitic (p).

Following the logic of equation (1), one can ask not only whether those with anti-Israel leanings are more likely to be anti-Semitic but also whether the *degree* of anti-Israel feeling differentially predicts the likelihood that one harbors anti-Semitic views. This framework does *not* require any assumption regarding causality, that is, whether anti-Semitism “causes” anti-Israel sentiment (or vice versa). Rather, our analysis focuses on information updating (as is common in Bayesian analyses). Worded differently, our research addresses the following scenario: when confronted by an individual espousing anti-Israel statements such as those cited in the opening of this article, what is the probability that the person issuing such statements is anti-Semitic? Working from a baseline assessment of the fraction of individuals in the relevant population who are anti-Semitic, the presentation of strong anti-Israel statements constitutes new information, which forces attention on the fraction of such individuals who are anti-Semitic. More generally, we seek the fractions of those with anti-Israel views of differing severity who also harbor anti-Semitic views (as opposed to arguing whether such anti-Israel views themselves are or are not inherently anti-Semitic).

The contribution of this article is that for ten European countries, we are able to answer our research questions empirically. We next describe our data source and method of analysis, after which we present our statistical findings. Not only do we find that the extent of anti-Israel sentiment differentially predicts the likelihood of anti-Semitism among survey respondents, but the predictions are sharp. Those with extreme anti-Israel sentiment are roughly six times more likely to harbor anti-Semitic views than those who do not fault Israel on the measures studied, and among those respondents deeply critical of Israel, the fraction that harbors anti-Semitic views exceeds 50 percent. Furthermore, these results are robust even after controlling for numerous additional (and potentially confounding) factors both singularly and simultaneously.

DATA

The Anti-Defamation League (henceforth ADL, <http://www.adl.org/>) commissioned First International Resources (<http://www.first-intl.com/default.htm>) to develop a study of attitudes toward Jews, Israel, and the Palestinians (Anti-Defamation League 2004). In addition to survey items probing such attitudes, questions addressed the degree of respondents' social contacts with Jews and respondents' attitudes toward others (e.g., different religion, immigrants). Respondents were also asked to provide standard demographic information (e.g., age, gender, income etc.). The resulting survey was administered by Taylor Nelson Sofres (<http://www.tns-global.com>) via telephone, resulting in interviews with 500 citizens in each of ten countries for a total sample of 5,000 (actually 5,004). No information is available regarding those contacted who refused to participate in the study, which raises an obvious statistical question regarding nonresponse bias. However, given that the goal of our analysis is to examine the relationship between anti-Semitism and

TABLE 1
Statements Comprising the Anti-Semitic Index with Corresponding Response
Frequency in Agreement (of $n = 5,004$)

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Response Frequency</i>
Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own kind.	1,052
Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want.	784
Jews are more loyal to Israel than to this country.	2,200
Jews have too much power in the business world.	1,309
Jews have lots of irritating faults.	545
Jews stick together more than other (CITIZENS OF RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE).	2,942
Jews always like to be at the head of things.	1,150
Jews have too much power in international financial markets.	1,460
Jews have too much power in our country today.	500
Jewish business people are so shrewd that others do not have a fair chance to compete.	884
Jews are just as honest as other business people.	485 ^a

a. Frequency of respondents that disagreed with this statement.

anti-Israel sentiment rather than to estimate the true prevalence of either, nonresponse becomes less of an issue. The situation is somewhat akin to epidemiological studies relating, say, the incidence of cancer to smoking behavior: there is no need for the proportion of smokers in such studies to mimic the true percentage in the population. As will be detailed below, the consistency of the relationship between anti-Semitism and anti-Israel sentiment across many different analyses makes it difficult to believe that the results obtained are somehow artifactual due to nonresponse bias.

THE ANTI-SEMITIC INDEX

Table 1 reports the eleven statements used in this study to measure anti-Semitism along with the number of respondents who agreed with each proposition. As in prior ADL surveys (Anti-Defamation League 1998, 2002), an anti-Semitic index was defined by counting the number of statements with which a respondent agreed.¹ Figure 1A reports the survivor distribution for this index, which is the fraction of all respondents with index scores exceeding x for x ranging from 0 through 11. Consistent with the prior ADL surveys, we say that a respondent harbors anti-Semitic views if he or she agrees with more than five of the eleven statements in Table 1, although we will show that our results are not particularly sensitive to this cutoff. From Figure 1A, the overall fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views equals 14 percent.

1. See the online companion to this article for interitem correlations, reliability, and other diagnostics for the anti-Semitic and anti-Israel indices.




Figure 1: Survivor Distributions Reporting the Fraction of Survey Respondents with Index Scores Exceeding x for (A) the Anti-Semitic Index (x Ranges from 0-11) and (B) the Anti-Israel Index (x Ranges from 0-4)

TABLE 2
Statements Comprising the Anti-Israel Index with Corresponding Response
Frequency in Agreement (of $n = 5,004$)

<i>Statement/Question</i>	<i>Response Frequency</i>
The Israeli treatment of the Palestinians is similar to South Africa's treatment of blacks during apartheid.	705 ^a
Who do you think is more responsible for the past three years of violence in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Israelis, or the Palestinians?	1,254 ^b
In your opinion, during military activities inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, do the Israeli Defense Forces intentionally target Palestinian civilians, or are civilian casualties an accidental outcome of Israel's military response? ^c	1,765 ^c
In your opinion, is there any justification for Palestinian suicide bombers that target Israeli civilians?	426 ^d

a. Frequency of respondents that agree a lot with this statement.

b. Frequency of respondents stating Israelis.

c. Frequency of respondents stating that the Israeli Defense Forces intentionally target civilians.

d. Frequency of respondents stating yes.

THE ANTI-ISRAEL INDEX

Table 2 reports the four statements used in this study to ascertain anti-Israel sentiment and the number of respondents who agreed with each. Similar to the anti-Semitic index, we used the number of these statements agreed to by a respondent to define an anti-Israel index. The higher the value of this index, the stronger the anti-Israel sentiment expressed. Figure 1B reports the survivor distribution for the anti-Israel index. Just under half of all respondents report anti-Israel index scores of 0, indicating no measured anti-Israel sentiment, while only 1 percent of respondents agreed with all four of the anti-Israel statements considered.

PREDICTING ANTI-SEMITISM FROM ANTI-ISRAEL SENTIMENT

To see whether anti-Israel sentiment is generally predictive of anti-Semitic views among the 5,000 respondents to our survey, we examined the survivor distribution of the anti-Semitic index for each of the five levels of the anti-Israel index. The results are shown in Figure 2A. The five curves are significantly different ($\log\text{-rank } \chi^2 = 286, df = 4, p \approx 0$), confirming that measured anti-Semitism differs by the extent of anti-Israel sentiment. It is noteworthy that these five survivor curves *never cross*: for *any* value x of the anti-Semitic index, the fraction of respondents who agree with *more* than x anti-Semitic statements *strictly* increases with the value of the anti-Israel




Figure 2: (A) Survivor Distributions Reporting the Fraction of Survey Respondents with Index Scores Exceeding x for the Anti-Semitic Index (x Ranges from 0-11), Conditional on the Anti-Israel Index Equaling, from Bottom to Top, 0 (Solid Bottom Line), 1 (Long-Dashed Line), 2 (Short-Dashed Line), 3 (Broken Line), or 4 (Solid Top Line); and (B) Fraction of Respondents Defined as Harboring Anti-Semitic Views (Anti-Semitic Index Scores Exceeding 5) as a Function of the Anti-Israel Index

index. Figure 2B reports the fraction of respondents who agree with more than five of the eleven anti-Semitic statements for the different levels of the anti-Israel index. Recall that of all respondents, 14 percent harbor anti-Semitic views. Only 9 percent of those with anti-Israel index scores of 0 report harboring anti-Semitic views, but the fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views grows to 12, 22, 35, and 56 percent for anti-Israel index values of 1 through 4, respectively.

THIRD-FACTOR INTERACTIONS

As discussed earlier, presumably those with anti-Semitic views are more likely to oppose a Jewish state than others; therefore, the greater the extent of anti-Israel sentiment revealed, the higher the likelihood of associated anti-Semitism via Bayes's rule. However, it is also possible that the relationship observed between anti-Israel and anti-Semitic attitudes is the result of third-factor interactions. For example, those who are intolerant of others (e.g., different religion, different country of origin) might be more likely to express both anti-Semitic and anti-Israel sentiment as a result. Does the relationship displayed in Figure 2B survive when one controls for possible confounding factors?

Figure 3 explores such interactions by reporting the fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views as a function of anti-Israel index levels while controlling for the levels of third factors. The most important observation from this graphical exploration is that the panels of Figure 3 repeat the basic pattern shown in Figure 2B for essentially all levels of all factors. Figure 3A shows that within each of the ten countries surveyed, the fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views increases with the extent of anti-Israel sentiment measured. While there is considerable variation among these countries in measured anti-Semitism overall—ranging from 8 percent in Denmark and the Netherlands to 22 percent in Spain—the association between anti-Israel and anti-Semitic leanings appears in each country. Figure 3B shows that for each of several different income levels (and including those who refused to divulge their income), the fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views increases with the anti-Israel index. Figure 3C considers the interaction between anti-Semitism, anti-Israel sentiment, and religion. For Christian respondents and those who profess no religion, the fraction reporting anti-Semitic index values in excess of 5 strongly increases with reported anti-Israel sentiment. This is also true of those reporting "other" as their religious affiliation. Among Muslims, the reported level of anti-Semitism jumps past 60 percent for those with anti-Israel index values of 2 or more; a similar rapid rise is seen among those refusing to state their religion. Even among Jewish respondents, one sees an increase in anti-Semitic responses as the anti-Israel index increases, but note that there are only 25 Jewish respondents (compared to 2,970 Christians, 1,547 reporting no religion, 92 Muslims, 295 reporting "other," and 75 who refused to state their religion). Among these 25 Jewish respondents, 13 scored 0 on the anti-Israel index (with one of these scoring over 5 on the anti-Semitic index), 10 scored 1 on the anti-Israel index (with 2 reporting anti-Semitic leanings), and 2 scored 2 on the anti-Israel index (with 1




Figure 3 Fraction of Respondents Harboring Anti-Semitic Views (Anti-Semitic Index Scores Exceeding 5) as a Function of the Anti-Israel Index Equaling 0 (Solid Black), 1 (Forward Slash), 2 (Back Slash), 3 (Cross-Hatch), and 4 (Horizontal Bar) Controlling for (A) Country of Residence, (B) Income, (C) Religion, (D) Attitudes toward Illegal Immigrants (See Text), (E) Frequency of Contact with Jews (See Text), and (F) Fraction of Respondents Agreeing with Specific Anti-Semitic Attitudes (See Table 1), as a Function of the Anti-Israel Index Equaling 0 (Solid Black), 1 (Forward Slash), 2 (Back Slash), 3 (Cross-Hatch), and 4 (Horizontal Bar)

reporting anti-Semitic leanings). When considering the statement “Illegal immigrants today are a burden on our economy because they take our jobs, housing and health care,” Figure 3D repeats the same relation between anti-Semitism and the anti-Israel index for all attitudes toward illegal immigrants. Does the extent of contact respondents have with Jews matter? The survey asked respondents, “Approximately how often would you say that you come into contact with Jews either at work or in social occasions?” Figure 3E reports the by now familiar relationship between anti-Semitism and the anti-Israel index for different levels of contact. Finally, Figure 3F reports the fraction of respondents who agree with specific anti-Semitic canards (Table 1) as a function of the anti-Israel index. Whether the accusation is that “Jews have too much power in our country,” “Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want,” or “Jews don’t care

what happens to anyone but their own kind," the fraction of respondents agreeing with these (and the rest of the) anti-Semitic stereotypes consistently increases as a function of the anti-Israel index.

MULTIFACTOR MODEL

To further explore the association between the fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views and the anti-Israel index, we fit a multiple logistic regression model to the survey data. Such a model enables estimation of the level of anti-Semitism as a function of the anti-Israel index while simultaneously controlling for possible confounding factors. The model also enables estimation of the independent effects (if any) of these same factors on the fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views.

Several findings emerge from the results shown in Table 3.² First, even after controlling for respondents' country of residence, age, religion, income, gender, extent of contact with Jews, attitudes toward people of other races/religions, and attitudes toward illegal immigrants, the relationship between anti-Semitism and anti-Israel attitudes remains intact. The odds ratios of the fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views for anti-Israel index scores greater than 0 (relative to those with an anti-Israel index of 0) equal 1.59, 3.28, 6.51, and 10.94 for anti-Israel index scores of 1 through 4, respectively. All of these scores are significantly different from unity (which would occur if anti-Israel index levels carried no information about anti-Semitism). The mitigating effects of the possible confounds considered are minor, as the equivalent odds ratios associated with the uncontrolled results of Figure 2B equal 1.43, 2.92, 5.45, and 12.94 for anti-Israel index scores of 1 through 4, a similar set of ratios with the same qualitative implications as the figures derived from the logistic model. Furthermore, of all the factors considered in this model, the anti-Israel index is by far the most important, as indicated by its chi-square of 196 at 4 degrees of freedom.

While simultaneously considering the factors shown in Table 3 did not meaningfully alter the relationship between anti-Semitism and anti-Israel attitudes in the data, these other factors all tested significant in their own right, as can be seen from their associated chi-square statistics in Table 3. The important relationships between these factors and anti-Semitism will now be summarized. First, the fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views tends to increase with age. Second, relative to Christians, Muslim respondents are much more likely to harbor anti-Semitic views (odds ratio = 7.8). There was no statistically significant difference between the fraction of anti-Semitic responses obtained from Jews, other religions, or those reporting no religion as compared to Christians, although those who refused to identify their religion were more likely to harbor anti-Semitic views. Third, the fraction of anti-Semitic responses tended to decline as income increased. Fourth, women were much less likely than men to report anti-Semitic results. Fifth, the level of contact with Jews had no statistically significant relation to anti-Semitism, except that those who did not know how much contact they had with Jews were much less likely

2. A more complete table reporting estimated coefficients, standard errors, coefficient z-statistics and p-values, and overall goodness-of-fit tests appears in the online companion to this article.

TABLE 3

Multifactor Logistic Model Predicting the Probability a Respondent Reports an Anti-Semitic Index Exceeding 5 from the Anti-Israel Index, Controlling for Country of Residence, Age, Religion, Income, Gender, Contact with Jews, Commonality with Other Races/Religions, and Attitudes toward Immigrants

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Odds Ratio</i>	<i>95% Confidence Interval</i>	
		<i>Lower</i>	<i>Upper</i>
Anti-Israel Index (Relative to 0)			
1	1.59	1.28	1.99
2	3.28	2.56	4.19
3	6.51	4.68	9.04
4	10.94	5.93	20.17
Country (Relative to NL)			
AUS	2.82	1.79	4.44
BEL	2.37	1.51	3.72
DEN	1.21	0.73	2.01
FR	2.30	1.43	3.70
GER	2.58	1.63	4.08
IT	2.11	1.31	3.38
SP	4.56	2.91	7.15
SWI	3.20	2.05	5.02
UK	1.45	0.90	2.34
Age (Relative to 18-24)			
25-34	1.10	0.73	1.66
35-44	1.25	0.85	1.84
45-54	1.62	1.10	2.39
55-64	2.03	1.37	3.01
Refuse	0.98	0.29	3.36
Unknown	2.62	1.77	3.87
Religion (Relative to Christianity)			
Islam	7.80	4.69	12.98
Judaism	1.84	0.58	5.84
None	0.97	0.79	1.20
Other	1.39	0.94	2.05
Refuse	2.88	1.52	5.47
Income (Relative to < 11K Euros)			
11-33	0.75	0.58	0.98
33-66	0.56	0.41	0.77
66-99	0.43	0.26	0.69
99-132	0.65	0.30	1.40
Over 132	0.48	0.19	1.19
Refuse	0.72	0.56	0.94
Gender (Relative to Male)			
Female	0.62	0.52	0.75
Contact with Jews (Relative to Never Any Contact)			
Hardly ever	0.79	0.61	1.01
Once in while	0.77	0.59	1.00
Fairly often	0.76	0.52	1.12
Very often	0.97	0.62	1.51

(continued)

TABLE 3 (continued)

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Odds Ratio</i>	<i>95% Confidence Interval</i>	
		<i>Lower</i>	<i>Upper</i>
v Refuse	0.31	0.04	2.49
Unknown	0.34	0.21	0.54
Not Much in Common Other Races/Religions? (Relative to Disagree a Lot)			
Disagree	1.20	0.92	1.56
Neither	1.25	0.92	1.72
Agree	2.33	1.80	3.02
Agree a lot	2.23	1.62	3.06
Refuse	2.00	0.68	5.94
Unknown	0.75	0.34	1.65
Immigrants Drain on Economy? (Relative to Disagree a Lot)			
Disagree	1.45	1.07	1.97
Neither	1.37	0.92	2.05
Agree	2.12	1.60	2.82
Agree a lot	3.82	2.85	5.12
Refuse	1.21	0.34	4.31
Unknown	1.15	0.55	2.40
Tests for Terms with > 1 Degree of Freedom			
<i>Term</i>	<i>Chi-Square</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>
Anti-Israel	195.67	4	0.00
Country	75.22	9	0.00
Age	48.62	6	0.00
Religion	76.73	5	0.00
Income	19.73	6	0.00
Contact Jews	23.90	6	0.00
Common	60.41	6	0.00
Immigrants	97.50	6	0.00

to harbor anti-Semitic views (odds ratio = 0.34 relative to those who reported no contact with Jews). Sixth, the less one feels in common with other races/religions, the more likely one is to exhibit anti-Semitism. Seventh, the less tolerant respondents were of illegal immigrants, the more likely they expressed anti-Semitism.

An important potential explanatory factor that is not included in the model shown is education. Unfortunately, the ADL survey did not provide a useful measure of the extent of respondents' education, asking instead, "At what age did you complete your full-time education?" There are two problems with this question. First, the respondents are asked for their age at completion of formal studies rather than the actual level of education attained. Second, the response options for this question are as follows: sixteen or younger, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen, twenty and older, don't

know/not sure, and refused to answer. This range of ages is too narrow to assess meaningfully the amount of education received.

Finally, as a check on the sensitivity of our results to the specific cutoff employed in operationalizing anti-Semitism (anti-Semitic index values in excess of 5), we also explored ordered logistic models that estimate the probability a respondent reports *any* particular level of the anti-Semitic index (rather than only index values in excess of 5 or not). These more complex models did not lead to any important differences from the results described earlier, which is perhaps not surprising given what was shown earlier: conditional on the values of the anti-Israel index, the survivor distributions of the anti-Semitic index *never cross* (see Figure 2A), indicating strong explanatory power at *any* anti-Semitic index threshold and not just the ADL-inspired cutoff of 5.

CONCLUSIONS

We began this article by noting that extreme anti-Israel sentiment has been interpreted by some as anti-Semitic in effect if not intent. It is therefore important to consider the competing motivations behind such sentiment. There are certainly critics of Israel on specific policy grounds, but there are also anti-Semitic individuals for whom attacks on Israel are manifestations of prejudice. Given this mix, what is one to think when presented with accusations such as “Israel is just like apartheid South Africa,” “Israel is responsible for the violence in the Middle East,” or “Israel deliberately targets Palestinian civilians”?

Our research directly addresses this issue. From a large survey of 5,000 citizens of ten European countries, we showed that the prevalence of those harboring (self-reported) anti-Semitic views consistently increases with respondents’ degree of anti-Israel sentiment (see Figures 2 and 3 and Table 3), even after controlling for other factors. It is noteworthy that fewer than one-quarter of those with anti-Israel index scores of only 1 or 2 harbor anti-Semitic views (as defined by anti-Semitic index scores exceeding 5), which supports the contention that one certainly can be critical of Israeli policies without being anti-Semitic. However, among those with the most extreme anti-Israel sentiments in our survey (anti-Israel index scores of 4), 56 percent report anti-Semitic leanings. Based on this analysis, when an individual’s criticism of Israel becomes sufficiently severe, it does become reasonable to ask whether such criticism is a mask for underlying anti-Semitism.

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